Ok… I know we have all gotten “pep talks” like this, but I suspect no one is testing them on marketing first…

BTW, someone decoded the meaning of “Run IT like a business” for me today, evidently that means “chargebacks”. 

Cheers, Erik

Dilbert… Still funny.

The Beauty of Virtualization
AoIS is hosted by Linode, which is a Linux virtual host service provider. The beauty of this was the fact that I could:

• Spin up a new host in 10 min
• Configure and test the box, without interrupting the “hot” server
• Move the configuration, data, sites, etc.
• Test, test, test
• Transition the IP addresses

All of the advantages of having a clean freshly build physical server, but with a pro-rated cost of under $5 !

FYI… As this is a security blog, you can image that I am somewhat obsessed with OS system protection, more on that soon…

Cheers, Erik

AoIS upgrade to Ubuntu 8.10 Complete !

I had the pleasure of working with Rebecca on a paper earlier this year. Rebecca and I were among the collaborators on a  paper focused on generating organizational support for Information Security Awareness efforts (link to paper) for ENISA (The European Network and Information Security Agency). The effort greatly benifited from her participation. And after collaborating with her is it clear to me why should would have been nominated for and received the high marks she did in the Computer World survey.

Rebecca is also the author of Managing an Information Security and Privacy Awareness and Training Program. I purchased a copy of this book while working on the ENISA paper, and wow is it a detailed guide to managing these programs. Rebecca has included information from the high-level “concepts” down to detailed sample checklists and plans.

Congratulations again !

FYI, for additional information:

• LinkedIn profile and bio
• Rebecca Herold & Associates, LLC.

Cheers, Erik

Congratulations Rebecca !

The CISSP is undoubtably one of the most, if not the most, important professional certifications in Information Security. Many organizations and practitioners rely on it as evidence of a solid foundation and track record in Information Security. But the CISSP is only one of the many ways that the (ISC)² attempts to fulfill its mission of developing the Information Security profession.

Board membership is a role of governance, guidance, and passion. Let’s briefly explore how Dan’s track record and past contributions demonstrate his qualification for this post, and possibly your vote.

Passion

Dan is someone who has a passion for promoting and developing the talent needed to continue to grow and mature our profession. Anyone who has seen Dan speak at conferences, local chapter meetings, or in one of his classes knows how passionate Dan is! But anyone who takes the time to approach him knows that he is no ideologue or zealot; Dan is always interested in improving his own understanding, and then sharing that knowledge with others.

Dan has a long track record as a contributor - as a “giver” - to the profession. In addition to teaching over a dozen CISSP review courses, he has also served on multiple (ISC)² committees, is one of the authors of the ISSAP Body of Knowledge (cryptography), and has published primary research on professional certifications. He is also the founder of the monthly Columbus, Ohio Information Security MBA (Masters of Beer Appreciation) meeting - a professional roundtable that attracts practitioners from across the state.

Governance and Guidance 

In addition to past experience serving on (ISC)² committees, which I assume led to the current board’s nomination, Dan has served on numerous Boards of Directors including local and regional community organizations, ISSA chapters,and several Toastmasters clubs. 

Personal Experiences

I have known Dan for almost three yeas. Dan and I have collaborated on a number or projects, including a half-day Cryptographic Controls Seminar and a full-day Identity Management Architecture class. It is my feeling that when you collaborate, work closely, and travel with someone, you really get to know them. You get to do more than hear about their College Sweethearts (which, for Dan, is Rebecca, his wife of 21 years), but you also get to understand their ethics, how they really conduct themselves, how they deal with stress, etc.

Given the entire picture, the understanding that I have of Dan Houser, I can think of no one better suited to representing, guiding and developing the (ISC)². I have voted for Dan, and I hope that you will consider doing the same.

Here is the voting link for (ISC)²: https://webportal.isc2.org/custom/votenow.aspx

Cheers, Erik

CISSPs… Lend me your ears…

Of course, a major problem with that approach is that the “persons of interest” are long gone by the time the video shows that “yep, you can definitely see some guy cutting off that lock and stealing that…”.

Another problem is that unless the equipment is being checked on a regular basis, it may be defeated (or just broken) for a long time before any problems are identified.

In the photo to the right, an NYC artist William Lamson, has created an interesting photo of hacking (or blocking) a security camera with a helium balloon. This is such a simple and inexpensive attack on the video surveillance camera that I am shocked I haven’t seen this before. I am also certain that the appearance of this in a TV or movie plot is imminent. It would have been pretty simple to use two balloons to block the camera without providing the nice tether to “fix” the problem.

Digital photography is a hobby of mine, and I have a mild obsession for photographing physical security faux pas (which to date has not resulted in any ‘Imperial Entanglements’ ). So I am going to use Mr. Lamson’s photo to kick off a new category (and series) on Art of Information Security, called “Security faux pas” - stay tuned…

Cheers, Erik

Coming Soon to a Movie Plot Near You…

• Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA) : http://www.isaca.org/cisa/
• Certified Information Systems Security Professional : https://www.isc2.org/cissp

Are You Ready ?
A few basic questions to ask yourself to gauge how ready you are:

• Do I meet the spirit, and not just the letter, of the experience requirements ?
• Has there been sufficient diversity in my experience ?

Five Step Approach to CISA or CISSP Exam Preparation

1. Perform an initial benchmark and assessment of your readiness
2. Read a “survey” level preparation guide cover to cover
3. Perform a secondary benchmark, and compare your readiness
4. Review official, or “deep dive”, preparation materials on areas identified as your weaknesses
5. Re-benchmark, and repeat targeted reviews until ready

CISA and CISSP Preparation

The Seattle Times is reporting today that Microsoft has developed the ultimate hacker tool for Windows. Of course, MS doesn’t consider it a hacker tool, they describe it as a computer forensics tool. Here is a quote from the article:

The COFEE, which stands for Computer Online Forensic Evidence Extractor, is a USB “thumb drive” that was quietly distributed to a handful of law-enforcement agencies last June. Microsoft General Counsel Brad Smith described its use to the 350 law-enforcement experts attending a company conference Monday.

The device contains 150 commands that can dramatically cut the time it takes to gather digital evidence, which is becoming more important in real-world crime, as well as cybercrime. It can decrypt passwords and analyze a computer’s Internet activity, as well as data stored in the computer.

It also eliminates the need to seize a computer itself, which typically involves disconnecting from a network, turning off the power and potentially losing data. Instead, the investigator can scan for evidence on site.

Of course, on the one hand MS has developed a forensic tool for use by authorized law enforcement agents. They have also produced a compelling proof of concept that their operating system’s security can be soundly defeated anytime an attacker has physical access. And they have also created a treasure trove of exploits to be reverse engineered.

It is well documented that cybercrime is not only big business, but that it is highly organized. The fact that, in the cybercrime underworld, there are markets for stolen data, toolkits (such as the Rock Phish Kit), and services (such as renting time on Botnets) is a strong demonstration of how organized (and profitable) cybercrime is. Microsoft has now defined a new Holy Grail for those organizations to pursue. The CSI/FBI computer crime report consistently demonstrates how significant the Insider Threat is, and clones of the COFEE will make those individuals that much more dangerous.

Also, the reverse engineering of one of these devices would certainly be of great value to the black hat community, and do potentially long term harm to desktop security. The fact that there are 150 exploit functions on the device written by Microsoft’s own, with their privileged knowledge, makes this device worth its weight in gold (or perhaps plutonium).

Given the number of governments that have been accused of either participating with or shielding cyber criminals, it is only a matter of time before these devices are reverse engineered and duplicated. Of course, it may not be necessary for the black hat community to acquire one to reverse engineer it. Many countries require public documentation of how evidence is collected and preserved. So it may only be a matter of time before Microsoft finds itself providing direct testimony, as other forensic product companies have done, on the exact workings of COFEE.

- Erik

Hacker’s Holy Grail - Redefined by Microsoft…

All provisioning solutions provide some facilities for:

• Reduction of paper-based processes in favor of electronic requests and work flows
• Reduction of manual updates in favor of automated entitlement updates

All provisioning solution providers strive to have a compelling story for these items. Additionally, these were the focus of the first generation of solutions which emerged in the ’90s.

For the Identity Management programs with which I have been involved, automation and risk management have been equally important. This is somewhat reflected in the definition I use for provisioning:

Provisioning is the processes and systems which:

• Manage the entire Lifecycle of an Entitlement from request, through approval processes, onto issuance, and eventual revocation

• Provide transparent views of the status and history of each step in the Entitlement Lifecycle through the creation of durable and detailed records, which include all the information required to provide non-repudiation and event reconstruction for each step in an Entitlement Lifecycle

Note: Fulfilling these objectives always involves a mix of manual and automated activities, technical and procedural controls.

Based on my experiences, having prepared several product selection scorecards in this space, there are two major approaches (philosophies), that provisioning products take in this space:

The provisioning system “sees itself as”…

• Coordinating identity and entitlement activities among systems with the objective of providing automation

- - - OR - - -

• Maintaining a single centralized record of reference for identity and entitlement, as well as providing tools to automate approval, issuance, revocation, and reconciliation

The “Centralized Record of Reference” concept is the watershed between these two. The systems that are designed purely for automation tend to focus on “Coordination” of external events. These systems often do not contain an internal store of entitlements. The systems that maintain a “Centralized Record of Reference” approach have the ability, through reconciliation, to validate that the entitlements in the “wild” (e.g., in AD, LDAP, within local applications, etc.) match the “official” state (which they maintain). This enables these systems to detect changes and take action (e.g., drop the privilege, report the discrepancy, trigger a follow-up work flow, etc.)

Which system is right for you?

This really depends on what percentage of your systems require tight oversight. If you are in an industry with low-IT regulation, and the data of your core business is low risk, then it may make more sense to invest in routine manual audits of a few systems, rather than monitoring your entire IT world. On the other hand, if you are in an industry that is highly regulated, with high-risk data, then the automated oversight and reconciliation capabilities are likely a good fit for you.

FYI, last week I co-taught a one-day class on Identity and Access Management Architecture at RSA 2008. For the last 3rd of the class, Dan Houser and I had a list of advanced topics for the class to vote on. I prepared a module on Provisioning, but alas it was number 4 out of 7 options, and we only had time to cover 3… As a result, a Provisioning slidecast is “coming soon” to the Art of Information Security podcast.

Cheers, Erik

Risk ROI for –Some– Provisioning Solutions…

(FYI, for the impatient, click here.)

There are two ways to generate random numbers on computers: (1) use a software program called a Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG) or (2) use a hardware random number generator. A Pseudorandom Number Generator uses a seed value to generate a sequence of numbers that appear random. The problem is that the same seed generates the same random sequence. The hardware based RNG observes and samples some physical phenomenon which is random, such as cosmic rays, RF noise, etc. (aka Entropy).

RNGs are important in Information Security because they are used to generate encryption keys, salts, etc. Historically, attacking RNGs has proven effective, such as the defeat of Netscape’s HTTPS sessions.

Most operating systems utilize a hybrid approach, implementing a PseudoRandom Number Generator that has a seed that is regularly updated through the collection of random hardware events. This process is called Entropy Collection or Entropy Harvesting. For most applications, this approach should be completely sufficient. However, one of the key assumptions is that the operating system has been up and running long enough for the seed value itself to become hard to predict through the collection of Entropy. Also, many of the Entropy collecting events come from properties of hardware devices, such as the minor variations in hard drive rate of rotation. As such, there are a few circumstances where the OS RNG may not be good enough for strong cryptographic key generation:

• Live Boot CD ( The start state of the RNG may be predictable. )
• Virtualized Hosts ( OS may be dependent on simulated events for randomness. )

( Given the exploding popularity of virtualization, this is an area worthy of research. Stay tuned. )

Design of the Got Entropy Service

Many RNGs (such as the one included in Linux, as well as OpenSSL’s) allow the addition of entropy from outside sources. So I started looking to Entropy sources I could use to bolster the RNGs on my virtual hosts (and other uses…). While I was looking into this, it occurred to me that I had an unused TV tuner card, a PVR-350.

When a TV is tuned to a channel with no local station, the ’snow’ on the screen is RF noise (the same as the static between stations on AM radios). But, for reasons beyond our scope, you never use a direct physical observation as the RNG. You have to ‘de-skew and whiten’ the data prior to sampling it. Here is the process that I use:

1. Collect about 3 minutes of video ( about 130 MB data ).
2. Using a random key and IV, encrypt the data ( using openssl & AES-128-CBC ).
3. Discard the first 32k of the file.
4. Use each of the following 32k blocks as samples.
5. Compress each sample with SHA-256.
6. Discard the last block.

• Steps 2 and 3 remove any patterns, such as MPEG file formatting, from the data.
• Steps 4 and 5 generate a 32-byte random value ( 1024 to 1 compression in the hash ).

Check it out at http://gotentropy.artofinfosec.com

Can an Attacker Broadcast a Signal to Undermine This?

Such an attacker could not remove RF noise from the received signal. Our eyes and brains are good at filtering out the noise in the TV video, but there is a lot of it. Part of the noise comes from the atmospheric background RF, but there are also flaws (noise) in the tuner’s radio and analog-to-digital capture circuitry.

I think this is a pretty strong RNG, and I have provided an interface for pulling just the values.

Also, I have written a script ( getEntropy.sh ) that will pull Entropy from the service and seed it into /dev/random on Linux.

Results from ENT

Here are results, from a sample run of the Got Entropy, analyzed by ENT ( A Pseudorandom Number Sequence Test Program provided by John Walker of www.fourmilab.ch - Thanks, John! ).

• Entropy = 7.999987 bits per byte
• Optimum compression would reduce the size of this 13366112 byte file by 0 percent.
• Chi square distribution for 13366112 samples is 233.85, and randomly would exceed this value 82.48 percent of the time.
• Arithmetic mean value of data bytes is 127.4767 (127.5 = random).
• Monte Carlo value for Pi is 3.143054786 (error = 0.05 percent).
• Serial correlation coefficient is -0.000078 (totally uncorrelated = 0.0).

Resources for the Curious…

• Wikipedia - Pseudo-random Number Generator
• Wikipedia - Hardware Random Number Generator
• NIST - Random Numbers Page
• Netscape RNG Attack
• van Heusden Video Rand

Cheers, Erik

Got Entropy ?

• Keep the software up-to-date

This may sound almost patronizingly obvious, but hold on a second. Every day hackers use unpatched servers or services of one kind or another as the bread and butter of their trade (stealing data, creating Bot networks, selling hacked server access to phishers, etc.).

Step four would also be to make sure that your operating system is up-to-date. Automating that is almost always possible, but is dependent on what operating system you are using. Google “X automated security update”, where X is your OS.

BTW, I found the jump to 2.5 very smooth and have encountered no problems - Thanks, Wordpress!

Cheers, Erik

Number One Wordpress Security Step

In fact, I found the article to be rather upsetting. Not because of the article’s thesis that strong authentication through a national ID program would not necessarily pose a threat to privacy; but rather, because of their naive (and irresponsible) handling of the realities of the biometric authentication challenge. They gloss over the real security challenges with creating a national biometric infrastructure. Here are the two quotes that are most misleading:

• “Confusing privacy with anonymity has delayed implementation of robust, virtually tamper-proof biometric authentication to replace paper-based forms of ID that neither assure privacy nor reliably prove identity.”
• “This emerging technology makes it virtually impossible to assume someone else’s unique identity.”

The problem that the authors are glossing over is that no such technology exists today, and it is unlikely to ever exist. Now, to be fair, I am assuming that a critical success factor for any national biometric program, as described, would be that the authentication devices have to be available, and usable, anyplace paper-based IDs can be used today. This of course implies that the authenticator must be an inexpensive, commodity device, easy to purchase, maintain, and operate. Such a device would have to be even more ubiquitous than the electronic credit card machine.

The problem is that the authenticator itself may be in the possession of the attacker (Perhaps after you authenticate your legitimate purchase the clerk desires to use your identity herself…). In the history of security controls, when the attacker has unsupervised at-will physical access, the attacker wins. Here are a few examples:

• Defeated copy protection on DVDs ( more & more info)
• Cold Boot Crypto Attack on hard disk encryption (more info)
• MiFare RFID Cards (more info)
• Skimming devices attached to ATM machines to steal card and PIN data (more info)

Of course, all of these systems worked in the lab. But when a security system is widely deployed, it has to withstand an enormous amount of scrutiny, and minor flaws will be exploited. And of course, the greater the financial gain, the greater the time and energy attackers invest in trying to defeat the system. The authors of the article ignore these issues, idealistically assuming biometrics will just work.

Now, of course there are lots of examples where biometrics work very effectively. But I would propose that biometric authentication is most useful when the authentication device is physically secure and the authentication itself is supervised. The MiFare example above also demonstrates two other issues:

• The system chose not to implement a reviewed and standard cryptographic algorithm - always a bad idea
• MiFare was able to sell 1 billion cards and authenticators before the system failed

The cost of investing in a national biometric authentication program, and then having the security fail, is enormous. Can you imagine deploying a biometric authentication infrastructure to every bank, police car, restaurant, shop, etc. and then having video on YouTube of it being defeated ?

- Erik

BTW, Maybe the attacker doesn’t even need to tamper with the device -> ftp://ftp.ccc.de/pub/video/Fingerabdruck_Hack/fingerabdruck.mpg

What do the Cold Boot Crypto Attack, DVD Players, and MiFare tell us about the Future of Biometrics?

Here is the link to Cincinnati ISACA Feb. 12 meeting and workshop information page.

Thanks, Erik

Erik T. Heidt, CISA, CISSP

Cincinnati ISACA Feb 12th Meeting

Well, I recentry learned about Google Trends, which is an analysis tool from Google that allows you to see how often specific search terms are being entered into the Google search engine. So, just for fun I thouigt I would try comparing CISSP and CISA:

The Google trend data would seem to indicate the overall interest in Information Security certiications has been declining, and that there is little to no difference in interest levels between the CISSP and the CISA.
Cheers,
Erik

Google Trends: CISSP vs CISA

Blended Attacks Targeting Both Physical and IT Domains
In 2007, criminals demonstrated their evolving ingenuity by employing blended attacks to obtain sensitive information and evade detection. The most significant example of this trend was a string of attacks on Stop & Shop supermarkets in Rhode Island. Attackers broke into and vandalized supermarkets, leading police to believe the events were largely petty crimes. But during the break-ins, attackers tampered with the stores’ card readers to collect credit card information.

Of course, upon reading this there was a stream of attack ideas that occurred to me such as using a break-in as a cover for things like installing WIFI access to networks, card skimmers, key loggers, etc. Shortly after reading the Cisco report, I ran into a post on Black Bag (a physical security blog) about a TV show called Tiger Team. The TV show is about a team of penetration testers who (in addition to being very impressed with themselves) test complex physical security systems. I reviewed the first two episodes (which I have to confess I enjoyed), which are available via streaming video.

Interestingly, in the first two episodes (which is all I have watched so far…) the team always used a blended attack. There is a social engineering and digital attack as a prelude to the actual ‘theft’ in both episodes.

I think few people will face attackers of this sophistication, but the series is interesting nonetheless.

Cheers, Erik

Blended Attacks and “The Tiger Team”

I would love to know what kinds of questions you have and would like to see addressed.

In addition to your question, please provide a little context, such as:

- What are the drivers for your use of cryptographic controls (data protection, compliance, etc.)?
- Will your deployment be externally audited?

Cheers,
Erik

Cross posted on Linked In.

What do you want to know about Cryptography in the Enterprise ?

GTAG’s

The Institute of Internal Auditors has been releasing a white paper series on issues related to IT Risk Management and Information Security. The paper’s are titled as GTAGs, which is an acronym for Global Technology Audit Guidance. The project is very ambitious, trying to break down major technical topics, the IT risks associated with them, and the controls that are available in a concise format accessible to senior risk executives.

Of the nine that have been released to date, several caught my eye. Here are the ones I would like to highlight:

• Auditing Application Controls
• Change and Patch Management Controls
• Identity and Access Management
• Information Technology Outsourcing
• Managing and Auditing Privacy Risks
• Managing and Auditing IT Vulnerabilities

You can find the library of papers at The IIA’s GTAG portal. New materials are released regularly.

In Other News…

Earlier this month I participated in a Webinar titled “Getting More Encryption for Less”. At the end of the call there were a few interesting questions during the Q and A session, one of which I wanted to recap here…

Question: Will Federal Privacy Regulations include Cryptography Standards for “Safe Harbors” ?

• Discuss what a Safe Harbor is, using California Security Breach Information Act (SB-1386) as an example
• Introduce NIST, FIPS, and FIPS 140-2

Cheers, Erik

Art of Information Security Episode 002: GTAGs and Safe Harbors

A key component in a lot of fraud and scams is Social Engineering of one kind or another. Social Engineering is also a a huge threat to Information Security controls of all kinds. The tool to combat it is user awareness. I applaud FakeChecks.org for their efforts.

Cheers, Erik

Get Rich Quick at FakeChecks.Org - N O T

But don’t think I am going to ‘rest on my laurels’…

The last month has been incredibly busy, and I have a ton of content that I want to work on but I keep getting pulled in different directions. Episode 2 is going to be an audio only podcast which I hope to have released over the weekend…

I have a number of topics that I am mulling over for Episodes 3 and beyond, which include:

- Basics of Information Security and Risk Management series

- Quick intro to some of the open source host protection tools I have been working with

- Discussion of my favorite open source security tool… (openSSL)

- and I am dying to start discussing some real world cryptography topics…

(Just to name a few…)

What I would really like to do is find out what topics you are interested in, so that Art of Information Security can have relevant and compelling content. To address this need I have created a feedback section on the site, located in the main menu bar (or click here). Also, your comments, posted either on Art of Information Security or via email, are always welcome.

BTW: Last week I participated in a webinar entitled Getting More Encryption for Less with Paul Stamp (Forrester Research), Jim Porell (Chief Architect IBM System z), and Paul Turner (VP, Product and Customer Solutions, Venafi). (Click here to listen to a replay.) Also, I will recap the Q & A portion of the webinar in Episode 2.

Best regards, Erik

Episode 2 and Beyond - A Few Teasers…

Here is a link to the RSA Europe 2007 podcasts…

There are 16 conference participants with whom RSA did podcasts.

Check them out…

RSA Has Posted Podcasts From The Conference…

Here it is !

This is the first podcast in the series I have planned. This is a slidecast of the Quick Business Case presentation which I recently delivered at RSA Europe (and similar to the presentation I delivered at RSA USA back in February).

As this is my first foray into this media - combining audio podcasting with presentation slides - please accept a few production glitches and provide feedback.

Cheers,

Erik Heidt

Art of Info Sec 001: Quick Business Case